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Statement of technical details of the capability being described
CTV operations near Space Station Freedom will require positive collision avoidance maneuver
(CAM) capability to preclude any chance of collision, even in the event of _ failures. This
paper discusses the requirements for CAM, and reviews the CAM design approach and design
of the Orbiting Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV); this design met requirements for OMV operation
near the Space Station, provided a redundant collision avoidance maneuver capability.
Significant portions of the OMV CAM design should be applicable to CTV. The paper will
summarize the key features of the OMV design and relate the CTV mission design to that of
OMV's.
CAM is a defined sequence of events executed by the CTV to place the vehicle in a safe position
relative to a target such as the Space Station. CAM can be performed through software
commands to the propulsion system, or thorough commands pre-stored in hardware. Various
techniques for triggering CAM are crnsidere_d, _ir]d-ttie°ds]_ associated with CAM enable and
execution in phases are considered. OMV' CAM design featured both hardware and software
CAM capability, with analyses conducted to assess the ability to meet the collision-free
requirement during all phases of the mission.
History of the origins and evolution of the capability
The OMV operated autonomously in the phase from Shuttle deployment through transfer orbit
(although with ground command capability for certain operatioffs) and then under pilot command
after reaching a transfer point near the Space Station or target satellite for the purpose of final
closure and docking. CAM protection was required in both phases of the mission with the
system specification requiring "the capability to move safely away from a target payload or base
of operations... ". OMV CAM design addressed the requirement that CA operation could be
initiated by the pilot on command, or automatically in the programmed mode of operation if
critical failures occurred. Redundancy management onboard detected and responded to failures;
the paper will describe this logic. To provide for fail-safe operation in both piloted and
automatic modes, a dual mode CAM was designed: 'software' CAM, controlled by the onboard
computers, and 'hardware' CAM, using updated parameters stored in hardware (registers)
providing firing commands to the thrusters which would move the vehicle to a safe position.
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HardwareCAM was designed to provide full fail-safe operation in the event of dual failures that
made the vehicle impossible to control, notably in the computers. Onboard computers kept
updated firing commands stored in the hardware CAM registers which would provide safe
separation maneuvers in the event of complete failure in the onboard computing and control
system. Superimposed on the dual mode CAM operation was an intermediate automatic
backaway maneuver designed to operated in the event of communication link loss during
rendezvous and docking operation. During terminal phase operation, the TV link providing the
remote pilot with visual data is obviously critical, and the link loss mode, which would lead to
automatic stationkeeping at a safe range, added an additional Capability to provide safe operation
while not requiring full CAM operation. .....
The level of maturity of the capability _: ,__....._ _:_ _ _ _,_, _: ._
Figures1 and 2_u;rate_e_i_0gicfl-0wo_e O_ :CAM operation, l_erfdrmance estimates
were made of the CAM operation in various scenarios, including phases of automatic:endezvous
operation (with the OMV Under t_e ESh_r_ma_=[er_dez,/ous s_ns6r,_a radar)and
terminal rendezvous phases under pilot control (via the communications link through 'I'DRS to
the ground).
Test experience and/or experlmentalresults :
Software CAM, which is basically a form of the rendezvous guidance mechanization for OMV,
can be initiated by the pilot and will transfer the Veh[c|et0_ap0int o'n theeV bar at an operator
selected distance. Performance verification of this CAM mode was accomplished by exercising
the rendezvous guidance algorithms, using various V bar standoff distances, for selected closing
scenarios (range and range rate). Hardware CAM evaluation Was performed by computing the
stored engine firing commands for various scenarios, and then simulating the response of the
OMV to hardware CAM initiation. Trajectories 0fthe vehicle were c0mputedafid confirmation
of collision avoidance was confirmed. Hardware CAM registers were designed, built and tested,
providing test firing commands in sequence to the attitud e con_ol thrusters.
Source/sponsorship and current funding estimates
TRW's OMV work was supported under contract to Marshall Space Hight Center. Current work
on crv applications and requirements is being supported under'contract to MSFC as part of the
NLS program and by IR&D funds in the area of servicing vehicles and autonomous spacecraft
design.
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